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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
NO. 96-7643 
 
IN RE: 
 
VARSITY SODDING SERVICE, 
       Debtor 
 
PNC BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
f/k/a FIRST EASTERN BANK, N.A.; 
JOHN J. THOMAS, Judge; 
GREGORY R. LYONS, 
 
v. 
 
VARSITY SODDING SERVICE 
 
PNC Bank, National Association, 
s/b/m/t First Eastern Bank, N.A., 
       Appellant 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 96-CV-00250) 
 
Argued June 23, 1997 
 
BEFORE: GREENBERG, McKEE, and WELLFORD,* 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 13, 1998) 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Honorable Harry W. Wellford, Senior Judge of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation. 
  
       Richard K. Hodges (argued) 
       O'Malley & Harris, P.C. 
       345 Wyoming Avenue 
       Scranton, PA 18503 
 
        Attorney for Appellant. 
 
       Eugene C. Kelley (argued) 
       Hoegen, Hoegen & Kelley 
       152 South Franklin Street 
       Wilkes-Barre, PA 18701 
 
        Attorney for Debtor. 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WELLFORD, Senior Circuit Judge. 
 
Varsity Sodding Service, Inc. ("Varsity"), incorporated in 
1978, was engaged in the landscaping and nursery 
businesses. In 1990, First Eastern Bank, N.A. ("the Bank"),1 
in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, financed the purchase of 
various pieces of landscaping equipment by Varsity, the 
now bankrupt debtor, for some $450,000. Varsity agreed to 
keep its records with regard to the loan at its principal 
office in Swoyersville, Pennsylvania. In connection with the 
loan, Varsity executed financing statements and granted 
the Bank a lien on "inventory machinery and equipment 
and furniture and fixtures."2 The security agreement was to 
be construed under Pennsylvania law, and it provided that 
Varsity would promptly notify the Bank of a change in the 
location of the subject collateral. The financing statements 
were continued in force through 1993 by filing in Luzerne 
County, Pennsylvania, and in the office of the Secretary of 
State of Pennsylvania. 
 
The machinery and equipment purchased by Varsity 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. PNC Bank is the successor by merger to First Eastern Bank. 
 
2. Other collateral for the loan consisted of accounts receivable and 
assignment of life insurance. The later modification agreement added as 
collateral a mortgage on real estate in Carbon and Luzerne Counties, 
Pennsylvania. 
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included backhoes, loaders, a mulch spreader, a trencher, 
landscape rakes, a vibrator plow, and hydro-seeders. The 
total financing arrangement between the parties involved 
notes totaling in excess of $500,000. The machinery and 
equipment are the only collateral at issue in this 
proceeding, and the parties have stipulated that it is worth 
only $82,600. See In re: Varsity Sodding Service, Inc., 191 
B.R. 306 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1996). 
 
After 1990, Varsity transported the equipment to 
Maryland and then to New Jersey. On December 1, 1993, 
Varsity filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11, at 
a time when the equipment was still in New Jersey. Varsity 
never filed financing statements in New Jersey. 
 
In the bankruptcy proceeding, the Bank filed a proof of 
claim as a secured creditor in an amount exceeding 
$500,000, and also filed a motion for a stay with respect to 
its claimed security interests. The chief officer of Varsity, 
John Yarosz, intervened opposing the Bank's claim, as did 
the bankruptcy trustee. The bankruptcy court held that, 
because the Bank failed to file the required financing 
statements in New Jersey, it "lost its perfected security 
interest in equipment and in the proceeds therefrom." The 
Bank appealed that ruling to the district court, because it 
stood to receive nothing from the sale or value of the 
equipment. In an order dated August 30, 1996, the district 
court denied the Bank relief and affirmed the bankruptcy 
court's decision. The Bank filed a timely appeal to this 
court. 
 
The district court below determined that the singular 
issue before it "was whether certain earth-moving 
equipment constitutes `mobile goods' for filing purposes 
under the [applicable provision of the] Uniform Commercial 
Code." If the collateral were deemed to be "mobile," then the 
transporting of the collateral to another state would have 
no effect on the Bank's perfected security interest in 
Pennsylvania under U.C.C. S 9-103(3). The district court 
agreed with the bankruptcy court that the equipment in 
question was not "mobile goods:" 
 
       The equipment consists of various items identified in 
       Yarosz' Exhibit No. 1. They are generally described as 
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       items used in the landscaping business including 
       backhoes, loaders, mulch spreader, trencher, landscape 
       rakes, vibrator plow, hydro-seeders, etc. None of these 
       items could be used over the roads. All of them would 
       have to be "trailered" or chained onto a flat-bed trailer 
       for movement from one area to another. While the 
       equipment is used to move earth in landscaping 
       operations, none of it is of a large-scale nature such as 
       what exists with regard to excavation equipment. 
 
The district court added: 
 
       [L]andscaping is not an activity that takes place over 
       such a large area that the equipment would be 
       expected to be in more than one state during the 
       course of a week. 
 
Perfection of a security interest ordinarily requires filing 
in a location in which the secured collateral is located. 
Pennsylvania law, however, provides for a four month 
period of protection for a security holder after a change in 
location from one county to another. 
 
       (c) Effect of change in location of debtor or coll ateral.-- 
       A filing which is made in the proper county continues 
       effective for four months after a change to another 
       county of the residence of the debtor or place of 
       business or the location of the collateral, whichever 
       controlled the original filing. It becomes ineffective 
       thereafter unless a copy of the financing statement 
       signed by the secured party is filed in the new county 
       within said period. The security interest may also be 
       perfected in the new county after the expiration of the 
       four month period; in such case, perfection dates from 
       the time of perfection in the new county. A change in 
       the use of the collateral does not impair the 
       effectiveness of the original filing. 
 
13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 9401(c). The purpose of this 
provision "is to put future creditors and subsequent 
purchasers of the collateral on notice of the lien." General 
Elec. Credit Corp. v. Nardulli & Sons, Inc., 836 F.2d 184, 
190 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing Industrial Packaging Prods. Co. v. 
Fort Pitt Packaging Int'l, 399 Pa. 643, 648, 161 A.2d 19, 21 
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(1960), and Casterline v. Gen. Motors Accept. Corp., 195 Pa. 
Super. Ct. 344, 351, 171 A.2d 813, 814 (1961)). 
 
Both the bankruptcy court and the district court relied 
upon In the Matter of Dennis Mitchell Industries, 419 F.2d 
349 (3d Cir. 1969), for its holding that the chattels and 
equipment involved were not "mobile" goods within the 
meaning of S 9-103(2) of the U.C.C. (13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
S 9103(b)). We note first several distinguishing 
characteristics of Dennis Mitchell from the facts of this case: 
 
       1. In Dennis Mitchell the debtor filed the requisite 
       financing statements in Pennsylvania, but the 
       collateral was never located in that state. 
 
       2. The collateral bought in New York was taken 
       directly to debtor's plant in New Jersey, and 
       remained at this location despite debtor's 
       agreement to send and keep it in Pennsylvania. 
 
       3. The receiver in bankruptcy sought to sell this 
       equipment to another secured creditor; the 
       lienholder in Pennsylvania asserted priority. 
 
       4. The collateral involved was industrial (plant) 
       equipment. 
 
The court stated in Dennis Mitchell: 
 
       Had the machinery been taken to Mitchell's 
       Philadelphia plant within 30 days after the security 
       interest had attached, it is clear that Pennsylvania law 
       would control, and Schwabe's Pennsylvania filing 
       would have perfected its security interest as the parties 
       intended that the property be kept in Pennsylvania (see 
       S 9-103(3). . .). 
 
Dennis Mitchell, 419 F.2d at 357 (footnote omitted). The 
court went further, however, to hold that the secured 
creditor's interest was imperfected after the secured 
property had been in New Jersey more than four months, 
even though the creditor had no knowledge that the 
property was not in Pennsylvania.3 Id. at 358. As a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The court cited no Pennsylvania law for this proposition, but 
mentioned the decision of a referee in In re Welker, 2 U.C.C. Reporting 
Serv. 169 (W.D. Pa. 1964). 
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consequence, the court in Dennis Mitchell concluded that 
the creditor's interest was subordinate to the rights of the 
bankruptcy trustee under the circumstances unless the 
machinery was of the type described in S 9-103(2). Id. 
 
The court then addressed whether the collateral 
constituted "goods of a type which are normally used in 
more than one jurisdiction," i.e., "mobile goods," under 
section, S 9-103(2). The court reasoned that the 
enumeration of certain types of goods was not intended to 
be all inclusive, and that the type of goods involved, not 
their actual use, is the key to resolving the issue. Id. The 
fact that "the goods may be and are easily transported from 
state to state" is not dispositive. Id. The court concluded, 
without elaboration, that "the industrial equipment [plant 
machinery] of the type involved here may not be 
characterized as mobile goods within the meaning of that 
section." Id. (emphasis added). 
 
In footnote 31, the Dennis Mitchell court cited to a 
comment following U.C.C. S 9-103(2), which emphasizes 
that the rule applicable to mobile goods may apply 
"whether the particular collateral in question is in fact 
mobile or not;" the real question is "whether the collateral 
is of a type normally used in more than one jurisdiction." 
Id. at 358, n.31 (quoting U.C.C. S 9-103(2), Comment 3. In 
the instant case, the bankruptcy court conceded, we believe 
correctly, that inherent characteristics of landscaping 
equipment suggest that its usefulness would be quite 
limited if it could not be relocated from site to site.4 Varsity 
Sodding, 191 B.R. at 308. The bankruptcy court added, 
moreover, that "the language of the UCC quite naturally 
lends itself to defining the normal use as focusing `. . . on 
the inherent qualities of the collateral and the uses to 
which such collateral would normally be put.' " Id. (quoting 
Konkel v. Golden Plains Credit Union, 778 P.2d 660, 663 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Golden Plains Credit Union v. Konkel, 759 P.2d 788, 5 UCC Rep. 
Service 1196 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988), discussed the meaning of S 9-103(2) 
more fully and was affirmed on this point by the Colorado Supreme 
Court, 778 P.2d 660, 663 (Colo. 1989)(en banc). The appellate court cited 
cases holding that this section included such items as (1) farm tractors, 
(2) heavy construction equipment, (3) excavatio n machinery, and 
(4) large earth moving equipment as "mobile goods" or equipment. 
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(Colo. 1989)(en banc)). Thus, the precedent relied upon by 
the district and bankruptcy courts leads us to a conclusion 
different than that of those courts with respect to whether 
the collateral in question constitutes "mobile goods" within 
the meaning of the U.C.C. as adopted in Pennsylvania. 
 
The district court, however, analyzed another portion of 
the bankruptcy court decision. The bankruptcy court found 
Varsity to be "engaged in a residential landscaping business 
[and] engaged in projects that were outside . . . 
Pennsylvania." Varsity was clearly a large-scale commercial 
and multiple residency project landscaping operation, and 
it utilized very substantial, expensive equipment as it 
moved regularly from one site to another.5  The machinery 
and equipment in question were admittedly readily 
"moveable" by means of a tractor-trailer. Yarosz described 
one "Skitsgear loader," as machinery which moved "topsoil" 
and grades land. He described the "trenching equipment" 
as that which installs "irrigation systems" and trenches for 
pipe connection (with four wheels and a "long boom off the 
back," a kind of "tractor"). This equipment would be like a 
backhoe.6 The equipment generally was capable of 
operation on a highway but was hauled instead. The 
"grader" equipment was similar to the kind used to "grade 
a street." We find such machinery and equipment to be 
substantial construction-type equipment akin to "road 
building and construction machinery" specifically set out as 
examples in 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 9103(c)(1). 
 
The remaining equipment at issue was lighter, more 
easily moved, and all of the equipment was normally used 
in different jobs, at different projects, in various states 
during the period of the security agreement. According to 
Yarosz's testimony, Varsity utilized the equipment in 
question on large commercial and residential housing 
project landscaping jobs. The machinery remained on sites 
outside of Pennsylvania for more than a year. This 
equipment, according to the debtor's brief, "had to be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Varsity's principal officer testified that it "did large landscaping 
projects and large trac[t] housing projects." 
 
6.  The "vibrator plow" is the same type as the trencher--it "vibrate[s] 
the 
pipe in instead of trenching." 
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dragged or hauled from site to site." We conclude from 
these undisputed facts that the "normal" use of such 
machinery would take it from state to state. In light of this 
fact, the bankruptcy court erred in finding that the 
" `normal use' of this equipment [would not] take it from 
state to state."7 
 
We find that the Varsity operations, including earth 
moving, were sufficiently "large-scale" in nature and akin to 
road grading, digging, and general excavation work that the 
equipment used meets the requirements and is 
characteristic of the mobile goods described in 13 P A. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. S 9103(c)(1). See In re Golf Course Builders 
Leasing, Inc., 768 F.2d 1167, 1168 (10th Cir. 1168)(golf 
course landscaping equipment, which was adaptable to 
land mining operations, was considered to be "mobile 
goods" under the U.C.C.). It was clear that Yarosz headed 
a landscaping company that became much more than a 
local residential concern. At least one of its projects 
involved $1,000,000. Therefore, the bankruptcy court was 
clearly erroneous in finding that "[w]hile the equipment is 
used to move earth in landscaping operations, none of it is 
of a large-scale nature such as what exists with regard to 
excavation equipment." It is immaterial that, generally 
speaking, "[l]andscaping is not an activity that takes place 
over such a large area that the equipment would be 
expected to be in more than one state during the course of 
a week." As is explained above, Dennis Mitchell, relied upon 
by the district and bankruptcy courts, actually supports 
our decision. 
 
In summary, we conclude that the equipment and 
machinery at issue constitute "mobile goods," given the 
nature of Varsity's landscaping business. The Bank's 
financing statements were properly filed in Pennsylvania. 
The Bank perfected its security interest and is entitled to 
priority status over that of the bankruptcy trustee and 
Yarosz personally. The equipment is of the type and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Our holding is consistent with the bankruptcy court's statement that 
the investment in this equipment "would require its use over a large 
regional area including from one state to another." Varsity Sodding, 191 
B.R. at 308. 
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inherent quality that its "normal use" would be reasonably 
expected to take it from state to state in the business 
conducted by Varsity. 
 
We, accordingly, REVERSE the judgment of the district 
court and award priority to the Bank in the equipment and 
machinery at issue. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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